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Ukraine’s Place in Europe and Two Decades of 
Hungarian–Ukrainian Relations1
Csilla Fedinec
Samuel P. Huntington wrote, “Human history is the history of civilizations.” Civilisation, in turn, refers to the complete way of life of a people. In the post-Cold War world, peoples sharing a cultural unity have come together (Germany), 
while societies with “civilisational” differences have broken up (the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia) or they have been kept together at the price of tensions – Ukraine belongs 
in this latter group.2 After Russia, Ukraine is Europe’s second largest country in area.
Independence Day
The breakup of the Soviet Union was the consequence of a reform process directed 
from above by the Kremlin, in which Ukrainians followed a path set by the Russian 
democrats and Baltic nationalists. From Kiev’s perspective, under Mikhail Gorbachev 
the government in Moscow sent several negative messages. For instance, in 1985, 
Ukrainian opposition members (referred to as dissidents) were prosecuted once again 
and many were imprisoned. Another instance was when the Soviet leader – who had 
already announced his policy of Perestroika – chose not to speak openly of the explosion 
at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in Ukraine (April 1986) until international 
pressure forced him to do so, and he then rejected Ukrainian Party First Secretary 
Volodimir Shcherbytsky’s request that the May Day parade in Kiev be cancelled. As 
late as January 1991, the clear message of the Crimean referendum was that if Ukraine 
should choose to leave the Soviet Union, then the Crimea would secede from Ukraine.3 
Even US President George Bush advised caution during his visit to the Soviet Union. 
In a speech to the Ukrainian Parliament on 1 August 1991, Bush stated the following:
Some people have urged the United States to choose between supporting 
President Gorbachev and supporting independence-minded leaders throughout 
the U.S.S.R. […] We shall maintain the strongest possible relationship with the 
Soviet Government of President Gorbachev. But we also appreciate the new 
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realities of life in the U.S.S.R. And since we are also a federation, we seek good 
relations – enhanced relations – with the Republics […] In Ukraine, in Russia, in 
Armenia, and the Baltics, the spirit of liberty thrives […] Yet, freedom is not the 
same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence 
in order to replace a distant tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid 
those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hostility. Rather we 
shall support those who want to build democracy […].4
Of the Soviet Union’s various constituent republics, Russia was the first to declare its 
independence – on 12 June 1990. Several others then followed, including Ukraine on 16 
July. In December 1990, however, the Fourth Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR 
rejected the independence of the republics and gave its support for the drafting of a new 
federal treaty. In March 1991, following a decision by the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, 
a referendum on the future of the Soviet Union was held. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian 
Parliament announced a referendum on whether the Ukrainian people agreed with 
the declaration of 16 July 1990, according to which Ukraine should be a sovereign state 
within the Soviet framework. The final result was contradictory, as a large majority of 
the Ukrainian population supported the retention of the Soviet Union as well as this 
special form of Ukrainian independence. The situation was no clearer elsewhere: in 
many of the constituent republics – in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia and 
Moldova – referendums were not even held.5
Thus, rather oddly, Ukraine has two declarations of independence. The 
aforementioned declaration adopted on 16 July 1990 – much of which is reflected in the 
current 1996 Constitution –, foresaw a sovereign state that would still be a part of the 
Soviet Union. The primacy of Ukrainian laws was proclaimed and the people acquired 
Ukrainian citizenship, but Soviet laws and citizenship were also retained. The real 
declaration of independence is the decree adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament on 
24 August 1991, which in just two sentences states that Ukraine is an independent 
and democratic state with its own laws.6 This declaration was then affirmed by a 
referendum on 1 December 1991. The process of obtaining international recognition 
followed immediately, with Hungary playing a leading role. The United States only 
recognised Ukraine on 25 December 1991, the day of Mikhail Gorbachev’s resignation.
It is difficult to overestimate the importance to Ukraine of the speed of international 
recognition. In a phone conversation with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on 30 
November (the day before Ukraine’s independence referendum), President Bush 
made it clear that the United States was prepared to support the Ukrainian people in 
whatever it decided in the referendum; the US would be willing to support Ukrainian 
independence if Ukraine permitted the supervision of nuclear weapons and if it 
complied with international rules governing conventional weapons and guaranteed 
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human and minority rights. For his part, Gorbachev spoke of how the Soviet Union 
was seeking to meet the demands of all its peoples and that the United States’ intention 
to recognise Ukrainian independence could not be viewed as anything other than 
interference in Soviet domestic affairs. Most of the constituent republics had already 
declared independence, but this would facilitate rather than impede their sovereign 
decisions on the new federal framework. For this reason, a positive final result in the 
referendum would not automatically mean Ukraine’s secession from the Soviet Union.7
The institutional framework established as part of Soviet nationalities policy served 
in a peculiar manner to facilitate the separation: borders, a Parliament, ministries, and 
so forth were already in place. When Ukraine became independent in a formal sense, 
it merely had to replace the symbols of the Soviet state – the national flag, insignia and 
anthem. Rather than create new ones, it reinstated – in an act of self-definition – those 
used by the Ukrainian People’s Republic in the period 1918–20. This political entity had 
sought secession from the nascent Soviet empire, but had never received international 
recognition. The need for restructuring was greatest at the ministry of foreign affairs, 
which had previously been a minor office dealing mostly with foreign delegations 
and matters pertaining to Ukraine’s representation at the United Nations.8 The tasks 
of developing and establishing foreign relations and monitoring international opinion 
were no less important than the restructuring of Ukraine’s domestic institutions.
Following independence in 1991, Ukraine’s old parliament, elected in 1990, continued 
to function until 1994. Vitold Fokin, the last Soviet-Ukrainian premier, became prime 
minister, while Leonid Kravchuk, the final leader of Ukrainian SSR, was elected as the 
first president of the new state. In 1994, Kravchuk was succeeded by Leonid Kuchma, 
whom Viktor Yushchenko then replaced in late 2004. Finally, in 2010, the present 
incumbent, Viktor Yanukovych, took office. Ukraine has a presidential-parliamentary 
system, in which the head of state is dominant but has variable power. The system of 
parliamentary elections (held in [1990], 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007 and 2012) has been 
altered several times, and individual prime ministers have generally had relatively 
short terms in office, and none of them has stayed in power for a full election term. 
Until the most recent elections in October, Ukraine had had 14 heads of government (19 – 
if acting prime ministers are also taken into account). All the presidents were former 
prime ministers; two prime ministers – Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko – 
have served twice.
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Ukraine Hungary
President Prime Minister President Prime Minister
Leonid
Kravchuk
[1990]
1991–1994
Vitold Fokin [1990]–1992
Leonid Kuchma 1992–1993
Vitaliy Masol 1994–1995
Yevhen Marchuk 1995–1996
Pavlo Lazarenko 1996–1997
Valeriy Pustovoitenko 1997–1999
Viktor Yushchenko 1999–2001
Anatoliy Kinakh 2001–2002
Viktor Yanukovych [1] 2002–2004
Yulia Tymoshenko [1] 2005
Yuriy Yekhanurov 2005–2006
Viktor Yanukovych [2] 2006–2007
Yulia Tymoshenko [2] 2007–2010
Árpád
Göncz
1990–2000
József Antall 1990–1993
Péter Boross 1993–1994
Gyula Horn 1994–1998
Viktor Orbán [1] 1998–2002
Péter Medgyessy 2002–2004
Ferenc Gyurcsány 2004–2009
Gordon Bajnai 2009–2010
Leonid
Kuchma
1994–2004 Ferenc
Mádl 
2000–2005
Viktor
Yushchenko
2004–2010
László
Sólyom
2005–2010
Viktor
Yanukovich
2010–
Mykola Azarov 2010–
Pál
Schmitt
2010–2012 Viktor Orbán [2] 2010–
János Áder 
2012–
Note: The last row of data reflects the situation in late November 2012.
The two gravest legacies facing Ukraine are the communist past and the still-present 
consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. The power station was finally shut down on 15 
December 2000 and Ukraine’s four remaining nuclear power plants (Zaporozhye, South-
Ukraine, Rivne, and Khmelnitskiy) now provide almost 50 percent of the country’s 
electricity. The consequences of the Chernobyl disaster remain a major environmental 
and health challenge. For Ukraine, this translates into huge costs – which the country 
would not be able to cover without international assistance. In January 2010,
the New York Academy of Sciences (NYAS) published a full summary of scientific 
studies on the nature and extent of the environmental and human effects of 
the Chernobyl accident […] in the most affected countries of Belarus, Russia 
and Ukraine […] According to the authors, at the time of the disaster, radiation 
levels reached 10 billion Curie, which is two hundred times the radiation from 
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. Worldwide there were an estimated 985,000 
Chernobyl-related deaths between 1986 and 2004, and the figure has grown since. 
Some 112–125,000 of the 830,000 ‘liquidators’ working at the site since the accident 
have died. Many women and men worked at the site without any protective 
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equipment; they were exposed to enormous doses of radiation and inhaled dust 
contaminated with uranium. […] Technocrats may not be interested in the health 
and environmental effects, but they will surely be shocked at the total cost of the 
disaster. In the first 20 years, in the three most affected countries, costs directly 
related to the accident amounted to more than USD 500 billion, or EUR 2,000 
billion calculated at EU price levels. This sum is the exact equivalent of the cost of 
constructing the world’s entire nuclear industry-related infrastructure!9
The Kravchuk Era
In 1991, the shortage of goods was even more evident than it had been under the Soviet 
Union, and the population also had to cope with an almost ten-fold increase in prices 
while nominal wages remained the same. The breakup of the Soviet “empire” quickly 
exacerbated the situation. By 1992, inflation stood at more than 2,000 percent, and 
after Ukraine’s exit from the ruble zone it increased to more than 10,000 percent in the 
course of 1993. Prices rose far more quickly than wages and fewer and fewer people 
had jobs. Some workers went unpaid for long periods, while an increasing number took 
compulsory unpaid leave – until the situation improved. Soon the shops were empty, 
while the supply of electricity and heating was regularly interrupted in order to save 
money. The social security system barely functioned or, in some fields, was abandoned. 
Live births fell drastically and there was a significant increase in emigration. Owing 
to these trends, Ukraine’s population fell by more than three million between the two 
censuses (1989 and 2001). The only group in society to prosper was the new elite made 
up of old Soviet functionaries. Exploiting the situation, such people acquired enormous 
wealth. In consequence of the general discontent, at the 1994 elections the Communist 
Party, subject to a ban between 1991 and 1993, obtained the most seats in Parliament 
of all the various political parties.10
For Kravchuk the most important domestic task was Ukrainisation, which in the end 
meant nothing more than the granting of official status to the Ukrainian language. In 
foreign policy, Kravchuk’s most spectacular decision was his renouncement of Ukraine’s 
nuclear weapons, the world’s third-largest arsenal (with 15% of the former Soviet Union’s 
nuclear weapons). On 14 January 1994, in Moscow, Kravchuk signed the agreement 
with Russia and the United States in return for a promise of significant amounts of raw 
materials and financial compensation. In February, Ukraine joined the “Partnership 
for Peace” program, and in November it acceded to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT).11 In a memorandum signed in Budapest on 5 December 1994, the United 
States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation issued security assurances 
to Ukraine.12 In this way, by 1996, Ukraine had become the first country to be 
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removed from the list of nuclear powers. This was also a decision of orientation, as 
Russia was seeking close relations with the “near abroad,” giving particular attention 
to the former Soviet military bases and the cultural rights of Russians who now found 
themselves outside the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, some Russian politicians still 
refused to regard Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group.13
From Hungary’s standpoint the central event of the period was its recognition of 
Ukraine as an independent country, which rapidly led to the opening of diplomatic 
missions and the signing of a basic treaty between Hungary and Ukraine.
Although these are relatively recent events, several myths have already arisen 
concerning the speed of Hungary’s recognition of Ukrainian independence. Publications 
in Ukraine usually state that Poland was the first country to grant recognition and that 
Hungary was “among the first,” noting, however, that Hungary was the first country 
to open an embassy in Kiev. In fact, however, as eye-witnesses have reported, András 
Páldi, Hungary’s first ambassador to Ukraine, was the first to grant recognition. As 
Consul General in Kiev, he had prepared in advance by ordering a plaque inscribed 
with the word “embassy.” The referendum was held on Sunday, 1 December 1991, and 
the result was announced the next day. On Tuesday, a fax was received from Budapest 
authorising the signing of a protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations. 
This then took place in Kiev on the same afternoon, at which time the new embassy 
sign was displayed. Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Zlenko was present at the 
signing of the protocol, and he and a number of high-ranking diplomats “congratulated 
[Páldi] that the Hungarian government was the first to support, through its actions, the 
establishment and consolidation of an independent state.”14
For Hungary too, an extremely important task was to strengthen relations with 
Ukraine. Indeed, in the post-transition period
Hungary’s Eastern policy gave emphasis to developing relations with the 
constituent republics of the Soviet Union, alongside its relations with a weakening 
Moscow. The Hungarian government gave special attention to Ukraine as it sought 
to consolidate its sovereignty. There were several reasons for this: the geographical 
proximity and economic potential of Ukraine; its strategic importance for 
Hungarian energy imports; Hungary’s security policy interests; and the presence 
in Ukraine of almost 200,000 ethnic Hungarians.15
As early as August 1990, Hungarian Prime Minister József Antall told Ukrainian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoliy Zlenko during the latter’s visit to Budapest that he 
supported Ukraine’s rapprochement with Europe as well as “the guaranteeing of the 
collective rights of the Hungarians in the Transcarpathian region. He made clear that 
Hungary respected European borders but also wished to see the granting of territorial 
autonomy to the Transcarpathian region.”16
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In Kiev on 6 December 1991, Hungary and Ukraine signed a Treaty on Friendship 
and Cooperation – the Hungarian–Ukrainian basic treaty. A provision of the treaty was 
that both countries would regard the border between them as inviolable (Article 2) and 
establish the necessary conditions for the mutual protection of the cultural, linguistic 
and religious identities of the national minorities (Article 17). The vote in the Hungarian 
Parliament divided the country’s elite: 279 of 405 MPs were present for the vote on the 
treaty, with 223 voting in favour, 39 voting against, and 17 abstaining. Most of those 
voting against the treaty or abstaining belonged to the largest governing party, the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum. The main controversy was whether, in connection with 
the treaty, Hungary should have raised the matter of Ukraine’s Hungarian minority. 
Opponents of the treaty criticised Prime Minister József Antall and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Géza Jeszenszky. Some observers have claimed that this dispute led to the split 
between the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Hungarian Justice and 
Life Party (MIÉP).17 In Ukraine, analysts noted how ratification of the treaty had been 
opposed in Hungary by the radical wing of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and by 
the Smallholders’ Party and that their main criticism was directed at a clause in the 
treaty whereby each side renounced any territorial claims.18 One side was troubled by 
what had been excluded from the treaty, while the other was pleased by what it did 
contain.
The basic treaty did not address the question of autonomy, which Antall had raised. 
However, it did contain assurances with regard to the Hungarians of Transcarpathian 
Ukraine. The official documents of the period refute the criticism that the treaty was 
signed over the heads of the Hungarians living in the Transcarpathian region: “On the 
contrary, multiple consultations were held with the leaders of the major Hungarian 
organisation in the Transcarpathian region [the Hungarian Cultural Association of 
Sub-Carpathia]. By signing the treaty, Hungary proved to the international community 
that it did not seek conflict but wished, on the contrary, to act as a stabilising force in 
the region […].”19
Hungary’s rapid recognition of Ukraine’s independence and its ratification of 
the treaty placed Hungarian–Ukrainian bilateral relations on strong foundations; 
even now the treaty’s provisions are an important point of reference. Adding to the 
significance of the treaty was the fact that Ukraine faced several conflicts related to its 
territorial integrity: the Crimean issue, Rusyn separatism (especially in the first half 
of the 1990s), and the Romanian question. A majority of Ukraine’s Romanians live in 
the Transcarpathian region or in Chernivtsi County (in historical Bucovina). After 1989 
demands were made in Bucovina for the region’s return to Romania (Greater Romania), 
while the Romanians of the Transcarpathian region sought the creation of a Romanian 
ethnic district.20 On 5 July 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a resolution 
condemning the Romanian parliament’s decision of June to declare the Molotov–
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Ribbentrop Pact null and void, which had raised the spectre of a rebirth of Greater 
Romania. The Ukrainian parliament’s resolution underlined, inter alia, that declarations 
on the illegality of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact could not result in territorial demands 
against Ukraine, and that Ukraine would reject any such attempt.21
The Kuchma Era
In the presidential election campaign, Kravchuk’s appeal to voters was based on his 
nation-building ideas and his successes in dismantling nuclear weapons. However, his 
opponent, Leonid Kuchma, the president of the National Association of Entrepreneurs, 
was more successful in drawing the public’s attention to Ukraine’s economic difficulties, 
to the aggressive Ukrainisation program, and to the need to rebuild relations with 
Russia. Some voters were also impressed by Kuchma’s pledge to make Russian the 
country’s second official language. The success of Kuchma’s campaign was not in 
doubt, given that the country was plagued by poverty. Although less than one-fifth 
of the population claimed to be ethnic Russians, in reality more than 50 percent spoke 
Russian as their mother tongue. In 1999, Kuchma’s strongest challenger might have been 
Viacheslav Chornovil, a charismatic former dissident and right-winger, but he died 
in an automobile accident at the start of the campaign. Kuchma then brought several 
election experts into his team and won the election by means of the same technique 
employed by Boris Yeltsin in Russia in 1996, when, despite his unpopularity, Yeltsin 
had managed to defeat the Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov. In the same manner 
as Yeltsin, Kuchma went through to the second round with a communist opponent, 
Petro Symonenko. And although the Communist Party had achieved first place at the 
parliamentary elections a year earlier, Kuchma managed to prevent a further “red” 
victory when the majority voted for the “lesser evil.”22
Though Kuchma had promised to strengthen relations with Russia, in reality he 
made efforts to establish closer relations with the West. In this endeavour he was 
actually more successful than his supposedly more pro-Western predecessor Leonid 
Kravchuk. It was Kuchma who announced Ukraine’s intention to join the European 
Union and to align itself with NATO. In 1996 Ukraine joined the Council of Europe, and 
it became the first of the CIS countries to sign a cooperative agreement with NATO. It 
joined the Partnership for Peace program and signed the Special Partnership Charter. 
In his speeches Kuchma always stressed Ukraine’s place in Europe.23
In economic terms, Kuchma’s term saw the introduction of a new national currency, 
the commencement of a broad privatisation program in industry, and the adoption 
of a land ownership law. At the same time, however, foreign investment in Ukraine 
remained rather limited. It was at this time that iron ore became the country’s major 
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export and main source of revenue. Thanks to excellent relations with the United 
States, by the late 1990s, Ukraine was – after Israel and Egypt – the third largest 
recipient of American financial aid. At the same time, the country became highly 
indebted to the IMF, to the World Bank and to Russia.
In domestic politics, Kuchma’s greatest achievement was the adoption of a 
constitution. Ukraine was the last post-Soviet state to adopt a constitution, and it did 
so under rather odd circumstances. A legacy of the Kuchma era was the “introduction” 
of the tools of “political subculture.” The first stage in this process was the adoption 
of the Law on State Power and Local Self-Governments in 1995. Under the rules, a 
two-thirds parliamentary majority was needed in order to adopt this legislation. Since 
there was no such majority, the normal parliamentary procedure was circumvented. 
MPs adopted the legislation by means of a so-called “signature vote” (signatures were 
simply collected) and it was then implemented through a series of presidential decrees. 
A consensus was also lacking when it came to adopting a new constitution, which had 
been under consideration for years. After another failure, in 1996 Kuchma publicly 
announced through the media that a referendum would be held on a constitution. 
Upon this unexpected announcement, the Parliament suddenly reasserted its powers, 
thereby preventing the adoption of a constitution without its consent. The draft 
constitution was debated for a single day, and it was adopted in a final vote the next 
day.24
One aspect of the Constitution, the peculiar status of the Crimean Autonomous 
Republic, is worth examining in particular. Chapter 10 of the document (there are 
in total 15 chapters) deals exclusively with this issue.25 It stipulates that the Crimean 
Autonomous Republic is an inalienable part of Ukraine (Article 134) with its own 
constitution, government and parliament, which, however, cannot take decisions that 
are counter to Ukraine’s constitution. Article 1 (of Chapter 1) of the Constitution of the 
Crimean Autonomous Republic (1998)26 repeats the provision in Ukraine’s constitution 
that the autonomous republic is an inalienable part of Ukraine (Cf. Article 134), while 
Article 2 states that autonomous republic’s legal status is grounded in Ukraine’s 
constitution. Thus, in effect the Crimean constitution avoids clearly defining the type 
of autonomy enjoyed by the Crimean Autonomous Republic. This omission is evidently 
related to background interests with little interest in autonomy or the special rights of 
the indigenous population, the Crimean Tatars.
The Ukrainian government and some domestic and foreign observers viewed the 
approval of the constitution as a solution to the ‘Crimean problem’ and to the 
secessionist desires of the Russian separatists. It did so by reaffirming the status of 
the peninsula as an integral part of Ukraine. Even so, in several fields, the region 
received independent rights of decision. Nevertheless, the final compromise 
could not entirely satisfy either Kiev or Simferopol, because the constitution fully 
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ignores the interests of more than 260,000 Crimean Tatars. The latter group had 
been permitted to return to the peninsula during the preceding decade – almost 
half a century after their deportation. In this way the Tatars make up around 12 
percent of the peninsula’s otherwise mainly Russian population.27
The formula is thus a relatively simple one: the lack of clarity of the constitutions of 
Ukraine and the autonomous republic on a more detailed definition of the legal status 
of the Crimea stems from the fact that the primary goal was to prevent “separatism.” 
Thus it is correct to speak of territorial autonomy rather than a concession made to 
each ethnic community. According to various experts, “The dominant position of the 
Russian community has turned what was formally supra-national autonomous status 
into an advance bastion of Russian-based identity.”28
The murder of Georgiy Gongadze, an investigative journalist reporting on abuses of 
power and the oligarchies, gave rise to the biggest scandal of the Kuchma era. Gongadze 
was murdered in the autumn of 2000. Around the same time a tape recording was 
made public in which President Kuchma is heard to discuss the journalist’s liquidation 
with the interior minister and the head of the national security agency. For a long 
time Kuchma denied that his voice could be heard in the recording, but then, in early 
2001, he admitted that it was his voice. He claimed in defence that the tape recording 
had been manipulated, whereby the most sensitive parts of the conversation had been 
conflated. This claim has never been substantiated. Even though the recording was 
made available on the Internet and anyone could listen to it, Kuchma remained in 
office. Protesters were dispersed by the police. The contents of the recording were 
compromising not only in domestic political terms; they also showed that Ukraine 
had made a secret armaments deal with Iraq.29 Even Ukraine’s participation in NATO’s 
mission to Iraq could not undo the damage.
There was one prime minister during the period who gained recognition abroad 
as a serious partner. Viktor Yushchenko, former chairman of the Ukrainian central 
bank, became prime minister in late 1999 and Yulia Tymoshenko became his deputy. 
Economic reforms soon led to results. In 2000 Ukraine achieved economic growth 
for the first time since independence, and the economy continued to grow until 2005. 
The government was able to balance the budget and reduce the backlog of wages and 
pensions. The Russian response to economic growth in Ukraine was to seek to acquire 
shareholdings in Ukrainian state-owned companies in the energy sector and in the raw 
material processing sector – in return for cheap energy supplies. Tymoshenko, a former 
CEO of the largest state-owned energy company, had considerable personal experience 
of the backroom deals. She made efforts to eliminate the gray economy and prevent 
the onward sale to the West of energy supplied by Russia to Ukraine. While she was 
still in office, Tymoshenko was tried by a court for alleged economic crimes dating to 
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the mid-1990s, but the court found her not guilty. She continued her political career 
by organising what became known as the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. In April 2001, the 
Ukrainian Parliament voted down Yushschenko, who then also established a party by 
the name of Our Ukraine (Nasa Ukrajina).30 Thus, in place of the People’s Movement 
of Ukraine (RUKH), which had lost support after the death of Vyacheslav Chornovil, 
there were two new centre-right parties.
It was during this period that a paradigm shift took place in Hungarian–Ukrainian 
relations. On the one hand, Hungary’s Euro-Atlantic integration caused no substantial 
problems in relations between the two countries, and the two sides showed flexibility 
in managing the related changes. On the other hand, there was a shift in Hungarian 
government policy towards Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries. Indeed, 
the new Hungarian government, which took office in 1998, made bilateral political 
relations subject to the issue of the Hungarians in the Transcarpathian region. For 
its part, Ukraine was of the view that this matter was only one of several important 
issues in bilateral relations. In February 2000, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán outlined the 
following priorities in a speech made in Berehove (Beregszász) to the general assembly 
of the Hungarian Cultural Association of Sub-Carpathia: to consolidate Hungarian 
institutions in the Transcarpathian region, to assist Hungarian families in the region in 
acquiring land, and, in the field of economic cooperation, to promote interest in Ukraine 
among businesses in Hungary. “Hungary has a special relationship with Ukraine […] 
This is due in large part to you, Hungarians of the Transcarpathian region.”
For Hungary, Ukraine is an important partner. Hungary has seven neighbours; 
even taken together, the other six are not as large as Ukraine. This in itself is a 
reason for the Hungarian government, when formulating its foreign policy, to give 
a special place to relations with Ukraine. I believe that the world is developing in 
such a way that relations between states should serve to strengthen cooperation 
at the regional level.31
An outstanding example of such cooperation was the joint action taken at the turn 
of the millennium when the Tisza River flooded, resulting in serious consequences. In 
the words of Zsolt Németh, Political State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
“It was good to see spontaneous examples of national solidarity both in Hungary and 
among Hungarians elsewhere in the world; it was only at the time of the Romanian 
revolution in 1989 that we experienced something similar.”32
In connection with the Tisza River floods of 1998 and 2001, which seriously affected 
the mostly Hungarian-populated areas on Ukraine’s western border, towns in the 
Transcarpathian region were included among the venues of high-level bilateral 
discussions from 2001 onwards, or such meetings were linked with events of 
symbolic importance to the Hungarians of the Transcarpathian region. The fact that 
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the concerns of the Hungarians in the Transcarpathian region began to be addressed 
in Ukrainian national politics – particularly in connection with the election debates – 
may also be regarded as one of the symbolic political advances.33
An important government measure in Hungary during this period was the drafting 
and adoption of the so-called Status Law (2001). In view of the provisions of the Basic 
Treaty, this measure did not cause the diplomatic complications that became a feature 
of Hungary’s relations with Romania and, to an even greater degree, of its relations 
with Slovakia. Orest Klimpus, Ukrainian ambassador to Hungary, stated that Ukraine 
viewed the legislation positively and with understanding.34 On the tenth anniversary 
of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the ministers of foreign affairs of the two 
countries, Anatoliy Zlenko and János Martonyi, emphasised in a joint article the positive 
aspects of Hungarian–Ukrainian bilateral relations; Zlenko commended Hungary’s 
visa policy, while Martonyi cited Hungarian foreign policy efforts to promote 
Ukrainian relations with NATO and with the European Union.35 A positive backdrop 
to such relations was provided by Ukraine’s minority legislation (Articles 15 and 
17 of the Minorities’ Act), by bilateral governmental and institutional agreements, 
and by the intergovernmental joint committees. Ukraine recognised that in bilateral 
governmental and non-governmental relations, there should be opportunities for 
contact between the national minorities and their kin states.36
Concurring with the statement issued by the European Union Presidency, the 
Hungarian government expressed its regret when Yushchenko’s cabinet was 
dismissed.37 Still, it was during Yushchenko’s term (on 14 December 2000) that the 
first negative appraisal of the situation faced by the Hungarians in Transcarpathian 
Ukraine had been made – in the closing statement of the Third Session of the 
Hungarian Standing Committee: “The most recent statement of the Ukrainian 
minister of education has given rise to concerns regarding the future of the Hungarian 
minority education system in the Transcarpathian region.”38 Meanwhile, in Hungary 
it was possible until 2000 to take a state language examination in Ukrainian at Eötvös 
Loránd University, Budapest. Thereafter for more than a decade and apart from a brief 
interruption, one could only acquire a Ukrainian language certificate in Hungary in 
the field of military technical language.39 Since Ukrainian is the official language 
of a neighbouring country with almost 50 million inhabitants where the teaching 
and knowledge of the state language is one of the foremost problems affecting the 
Hungarian minority, this situation was regrettable.
On 26 November 2003 – following Ukraine’s commemoration of the 70th 
anniversary of the Holodomor on 22 November –, the Hungarian Parliament 
adopted a resolution in remembrance of the “genocide,” which it referred to as an 
“artificial and intentional famine.”40 It was only during the subsequent presidential 
term, on 28 November 2006, that the Ukrainian Parliament passed a law defining 
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the Holodomor as a deliberate act of genocide and making its public denial illegal.41 
Under the Yushchenko government in the post-Kuchma era, the Holodomor was given 
primacy among the various historical topics. This was also true during the subsequent 
presidential term, although the topic received less public attention, as it was no longer 
the focus of political debate.
The Orange Era
Concerning the presidential elections of 2004, commonly referred to as the “Orange 
Revolution,” it is generally known that protests by the opposition (Our Ukraine and 
the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc), which drew support from the international community, 
led to a repeat of second round of the elections and that in this “third” round the 
previous manipulated result was reversed and Viktor Yushchenko ended up defeating 
the incumbent Viktor Yanukovych. A lesser known fact, however, is that this result 
was influenced by a background deal concerning presidential powers. The Ukrainian 
Parliament voted in “‘a package’ (i.e., in a single vote) both to curtail presidential power 
and to repeat the second round of the presidential election, amending the election law 
for this purpose. In other words, the opposition candidate with the greatest chance 
of winning the election (Viktor Yushchenko) and his domestic and foreign supporters 
agreed to limit the powers of the incoming president in exchange for a legislative clause 
enabling the holding of a ‘third’ round.”42
On 21 November, in the run-up to the third round of elections and in the presence 
of Fidesz’s Viktor Orbán, the presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko and the 
president of the Hungarian Cultural Association of Sub-Carpathia, Miklós Kovács, 
signed an agreement in which the Cultural Association agreed to support Viktor 
Yushchenko in the presidential elections
“with all available means” and throughout the Hungarian-inhabited areas. In 
exchange, Yushchenko agreed that, in the event of his election, he would support 
the Cultural Association’s proposal for the establishment of a Hungarian-inhabited 
district along the River Tisza. He also pledged to assist the rehabilitation of the 
Hungarian victims of Stalinism and their financial compensation and to secure 
permanent representation in Parliament for Ukraine’s minorities (including the 
Hungarians), to expand the language rights of the Hungarians of Transcarpathian 
region, and to ensure that financial resources granted by Hungary would reach 
those entitled to them. The agreement also provided for comprehensive support 
to be given to Rákóczi Ferenc II Hungarian Minority College, for the development 
of a network of Hungarian educational institutions in the Transcarpathian region, 
and for the establishment of an independent Hungarian school district within 
the framework of minority cultural autonomy.43
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On the occasion of the inauguration of Ukraine’s new president, Hungary’s 
President, Ferenc Mádl made the following remarks in a statement:
One of the reasons why we in Hungary are monitoring Ukraine’s development is 
that, as is generally known, people of Hungarian ethnicity are included among 
the country’s citizens. The Hungarian minority in Ukraine is making serious 
efforts, with the assistance of its educational and cultural institutions, to develop 
its homeland in the narrower sense. It is doing all this for the benefit of entire 
Ukraine.44
In the course of the 2004 presidential campaign, Viktor Yushchenko presented 
himself as a national (or even nationalist) politician.45 In speeches made during his 
time in office, he sought to reevaluate historical taboos, to demythologise the Soviet 
narrative, to develop a model that was more acceptable to the inhabitants of the various 
regions, while also seeking to promote the country’s unity.46 He emphasised unity in 
Ukrainian society and sought to bring together the national and liberal discourses. 
“We know that everyone is building Ukraine, regardless of the language spoken, the 
church attended or their political views. We all share a single fate, and we only have 
one Ukraine.”47 He repeatedly underlined that belonging to Europe was one of the basic 
values of Ukrainians. “The Ukrainians will be among the peoples defining Europe’s 
new image. Europe’s boundaries are set by the common values its nations call their 
own.”48
In domestic politics it seemed Ukraine would now be successful where it had 
failed after the 1991 transition: a new political elite was being established and most 
of the old bureaucracy was being replaced. After her appointment as prime minister, 
Yulia Tymoshenko, who had been a staunch supporter of Yushchenko’s presidential 
bid, announced a policy of “reprivatisation.” This policy, which actually meant 
renationalisation, caused some unease among foreign investors. Meanwhile, the 
country’s new leaders failed to maintain the economic upswing of the preceding 
presidential term. On the contrary, there was a reversal: the economy slowed, inflation 
increased, and Ukraine’s problems multiplied. It soon became apparent that the new 
elite was no less corrupt that the previous one. For instance, when Justice Minister 
Roman Zvarich failed to vote in favour of a law prohibiting the onward sale of Russian 
oil to the West, it soon became known that this was because his wife had interests in 
that field of business.49 Meanwhile, a rather odd interpretation of press freedom 
– one of the initiatives put forward by Yushchenko and his circle of supporters – gave 
rise to protests, and an attempt to include “Christian ethics” as a subject in the school 
curriculum led to a similar reaction. Similar controversy surrounded the use of the 
tax authority for political means, a policy initiative to unify Ukraine’s two Orthodox 
churches (one subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate and the other belonging to the 
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Kyiv Patriarchate – which in canonical law remains unrecognised to this day), efforts 
to undermine theatres and artists suspected of supporting the opposition, and a new 
regulation necessitating Ukrainian subtitles when foreign-language material (even 
a Russian film or TV show) was shown on TV or at the cinema. During this period, 
relations with Russia were tense. This was particularly so given that Vladimir Putin 
had given his support to Viktor Yanukovych at the time of the “Orange Revolution.” 
The matter came to a head when Russia, on two occasions, shut off the supply of natural 
gas to Ukraine. The stoppage led to a shutdown of the transit supply to other European 
countries. At the time, 80 percent of Russian natural gas was supplied to Europe by 
means of three major pipelines passing through Ukraine. Ukraine was forced to agree 
to a significant increase in the price of imported Russian natural gas, resulting in an 
even dimmer economic outlook.50
The Orange alliance proved unable to function smoothly. Tymoshenko became 
prime minister in early 2005, but she only held office for a few months. Among other 
things, she raised wages and pensions. Her government also increased payments on 
the birth of a child to what were dizzying heights for Ukraine.51 This latter measure has 
remained a permanent feature of policy, regardless of which party is in power. In 2011, 
the state grant amounted to 30 percent of the minimum livelihood after the birth of the 
first child, 60 percent after the birth of the second, and 120 percent after the birth of the 
third or any subsequent child. Ten times this amount is paid out immediately, while 
the rest is paid in monthly instalments over a period of 24 months for the first child, a 
period of 48 months for the second child, and a period of 72 months for the third and 
any subsequent child.52 The effect on demographics will have to be measured in the 
censuses.
Tymoshenko’s term in office saw a monetary outflow that held back GDP 
growth. Under her government there was also a “petrol crisis,” a “meat crisis,” and 
a “sugar crisis.”  The reasons for and management of these crises exacerbated the 
conflict between president and prime minister. In the end, Yushchenko dismissed 
Tymoshenko, blaming her for the economic downturn and the increased political 
tension.
The turmoil in the Orange ranks was reflected in the results of the 2006 
parliamentary elections and in the results of the 2007 parliamentary elections, which 
were brought forward. In 2007, Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, which had 
been soundly defeated in 2004, received the highest number of votes, while the 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc also improved on its 2006 result. There was a sharp decline, 
however, in support for Yushchenko’s political associates. Even so, at the end of 2007, 
Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc – still regarded as “natural allies” – 
were strong enough to jointly form a government. Thus Yulia Tymoshenko became 
prime minister once again. During this period, the source of most domestic political 
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strife was Tymoshenko’s policy of eliminating private companies from the Russian gas 
business in an effort to avoid a further natural gas crisis with Russia. The Ukrainian 
government’s preferred policy was for Naftogaz, the national oil and gas company, to 
deal directly with Gazprom. This policy resulted, however, in a significant increase 
in gas prices for domestic consumers. A major success in the international arena 
was Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in February 2008; 
negotiations on membership had been underway since 1993.
In 2009, the Tymoshenko Bloc and the Party of Regions began coalition talks: the 
main goal was a renewed amendment to the Constitution further limiting presidential 
power. In the end, however, the Party of Regions backed out of the deal.53 Tymoshenko 
remained in office until early March 2010, but relations between her and President 
Yushchenko deteriorated further.
Concerning Hungarian–Ukrainian relations during this period, two areas should 
be highlighted. The first was summarised – during President Yushchenko’s official 
visit to Hungary in 2007 – by Hungarian President László Sólyom, who stated the 
following on 10 January:
I attribute great significance to the initiative that we have mentioned in our 
statement today, which calls on us to pay our respects to the war dead, to mark the 
places where they fell, and to cherish and protect their graves. In this connection 
Ukraine has offered to locate the Hungarian victims who lost their lives on its 
soil and to properly mark their resting places. Hungary has gratefully accepted 
this offer and has undertaken to do the same. Today, I submitted to the President 
a list of 48,000 names of (Soviet) Ukrainian soldiers who died and were buried on 
Hungarian soil during World War II. The list was compiled by the Institute and 
Museum for Military History. Indicating the graves and cemeteries, it will assist 
in locating the final resting places of the fallen.54
Cooperation in this area is ongoing.
The second major area comprises issues associated with the Hungarians in 
Transcarpathian Ukraine. Hungary became a member of the Schengen Area on 21 
December 2007. According to a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Hungary has done its utmost to ensure […] that the Schengen Borders Code has 
the least possible impact on relations with the mother country of Hungarians 
living in (the Transcarpathian region of) Ukraine. By actively contributing to 
European Union policy we have succeeded in elaborating a system of measures 
that will keep the borders open for this broad section of the Hungarian 
community abroad. The European Union’s visa facilitation agreement with 
Ukraine serves this purpose […] as do also the Hungarian–Ukrainian local 
border traffic agreement, which entered into force on 19 December 2007, and the 
rate reduction pertaining to the important national visa.55
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Major changes took place in education, an issue of vital importance to Hungarians. 
In the second Tymoshenko government, Minister of Education Ivan Vakarchuk 
initiated a series of measures that regrettably realised people’s fears concerning 
school education in Hungarian. Among other reasons, this was because the measures 
“prescribed the introduction of the so-called transitive education in schools where 
Ukrainian was not the language of tuition, whereby the long-term goal was to achieve 
majority unilingualism through education.”56 On 3 December 2009, the Hungarian 
Parliament issued a political statement “concerning minority policy developments 
in Ukraine that were a cause of concern for the Hungarian minority.”57 Meanwhile, 
Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai wrote a letter to his Ukrainian counterpart, Yulia 
Tymoshenko, on the subject of the “school textbook scandal in Ukraine, which 
curtails the minority rights of the Hungarians in the Transcarpathian region.” This 
action reflected a concern in Hungary that school textbooks in Hungarian had not 
been ordered for the coming school year.58 At the time such efforts were fruitless.
Recent Developments
In the 2010 presidential elections, the incumbent Viktor Yushchenko had no chance 
of re-election. His two major rivals turned out to be Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia 
Tymoshenko. Yanukovych appealed to voters with a new and changed image: among 
other things, he had learned to speak excellent Ukrainian. (Tymoshenko had also done 
so years earlier.) It may seem surprising, but for some of Ukraine’s leading politicians 
over the past 20 years, the Ukrainian language and the learning process have been 
closely connected with their political career. Even so, language use has not always 
influenced ideological convictions: Yulia Tymoshenko was already an active politician 
when she switched to using Ukrainian. The presidential election was positively received 
outside Ukraine and no one doubted Viktor Janukovych’s victory. Once again a new era 
dawned.
Following the presidential election, Tymoshenko had to vacate the prime 
minister’s chair. Under the Constitution, parliamentary groups (caucuses) can enter 
into a coalition in order to form a government; the votes of newly formed groups 
and of politicians that have switched to another group or who are independents do 
not count in this process. Nevertheless, in October 2010, following a change in the 
parliamentary rules, a new government coalition was formed called Stability and 
Reforms.59 Under the new circumstances, the candidate of the Party of Regions, 
Mykola Azarov, became the country’s prime minister. Following protests from the 
opposition, the Constitutional Court conducted an inquiry and decided in favour 
of the new parliamentary rules. In May 2010, a criminal investigation was launched 
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against Yulia Tymoshenko and several fellow politicians. In October 2011, the court 
found the former prime minister guilty of abuse of office and sentenced her to seven 
years in prison. Tymoshenko’s illness, medical treatment, and hunger strike, as well as 
the prison conditions, have caught the attention of the public – and not only in a political 
sense. Moreover, the reaction of the international community has been extremely 
negative and Ukraine’s image has been damaged. The European Union has regularly 
expressed its concern and displeasure. Thus although the EU initialled a part of the 
Association Agreement with Ukraine in April 2012, there are no signs of the agreement 
being concluded in the foreseeable future. In May 2012, a summit meeting of Central 
European heads of state in Yalta was cancelled with reference to the Tymoshenko affair. 
A shadow was even cast over the 2012 UEFA European Football Championship, hosted 
jointly by Poland and Ukraine. Several foreign politicians announced they would not 
attend the event (that is to say, that they would not be present at matches played in 
Ukraine). This mixture of sport and politics evoked the worse memories of the former 
era.
In 2010, a “constitutional restoration” took place in Ukraine. As already noted, 
one of the deals at the time of the “Orange Revolution” resulted in a constitutional 
amendment limiting presidential power. Now there was a desire to get rid of this 
restriction, but parliamentary support was lacking for the needed constitutional 
amendment. Even so, a group of parliamentary representatives requested the 
Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of the original constitutional 
amendment (Act No. 2222-IV of 2004). In September 2010, the Constitutional Court 
decided, on grounds of formal deficiencies, to cancel the controversial act. It also 
stated that through this action the presidential powers contained in the original 
1996 Constitution had been restored.60 Opposition politicians gave little attention to 
this decision, which was broadly ignored by the international community. Then, in 
February 2011, the so-called Constitutional Assembly of Ukraine was established 
with the task of drafting a new constitution for the country.61 In late 2012, the exact 
course of this development is uncertain, and so the details will not be covered here.
Some commentators considered the adoption of the new Language Act to be an 
important step towards legal harmonisation with the European Union, while others 
saw it as preparation for the parliamentary elections of the autumn of 2012. The 
linguistic situation of the Ukraine – usually regarded as a nation-state – is rather 
complex. Ukraine is a country that historically has lacked independent statehood, a 
factor influencing its linguistic map. The nation-building (unification) process that 
took place in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries could not be emulated in 
Ukraine, which lacked a unified national territory. Although the standardisation of the 
Ukrainian language based on various “Little Russian” dialects and the development 
of a Ukrainian national idea in the latter half of the 19th century proved successful, 
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nevertheless these processes failed to exert a uniformising effect. The placement of 
regions of diverse historical heritage (pertaining to mentality, socialisation and other 
factors) within common borders did exert a uniformising effect during the Soviet era. 
Rather this process tended to benefit Russian – “the language of contact among the 
peoples” – rather than the Ukrainian language. To date, Ukraine has failed to cope 
with this heritage. Ukraine’s minority population comprises above all ethnic Russians 
(80%). Each of the other minorities constitutes less than 1 percent of the total minority 
population. Without the ethnic Russians, these other minorities constitute less than 
5 percent of Ukraine’s total population. Almost 30 percent of Ukraine’s inhabitants 
consider Russian to be their native language, and even more Ukrainians are speakers 
of Russian. Thus, all decisions relating to the minorities are closely linked with the 
Russian question: those who defend the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian national 
interests are regularly accused of Russophobia. In fact, however, the true victims 
of it are all the other minorities, forming far smaller percentages of the population. 
Those, on the other hand, who take the Russian question as their starting point, tend 
to be branded anti-national. The reason for this is clear: ethnic Russians in Ukraine so 
greatly outnumber the other minorities and are so close to being numerous enough to 
form a nation in their own right that if Russian were to be given the status of regional 
language, this would make Ukrainian – the state language – superfluous in a large part 
of the country. An inability to resolve this situation is the root to most of the political 
controversy. Whenever the minorities seek to make their views known, they are met by 
an unlevel playing field.
In recent years, the language issue has been an ever-present feature of public debate 
and political discourse. While there have been several attempts to draft a language law, 
none of the draft legislation has passed beyond the committee stage. The best chance 
for legislation came after the Party of Regions put together a parliamentary majority. 
At that time the first draft of a bill, jointly elaborated by a single representative from 
each of the parties in the parliamentary majority, was submitted to the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities and to the Venice Commission. This action was 
taken to counter in advance the expected domestic political turmoil. The reaction of 
both bodies to the draft was basically negative; in essence their concerns were similar 
to those of the opposition: the bill failed to adequately protect the state language. And 
so a new version of the bill was drafted. Representatives of the Party of Regions then 
submitted the bill, but representatives of the Jewish and Romanian organisations as 
well as Mihály Tóth, honorary president of the Hungarian Democratic Federation 
in Ukraine, were involved in its elaboration. The law was adopted under rather odd 
circumstances. During the parliamentary session on 3 July 2012, a final vote was 
absent from the original agenda. The parliamentary speaker, Volodymyr Lytvyn, was 
summoned to the Presidential office for consultations, which became so drawn out 
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that Lytvyn was unable to return to Parliament until the evening. In the meantime, a 
final vote had been held without his knowledge. In protest, the scholar historian Lytvyn 
(chairman of the People’s Party) threatened to resign and demanded an inquiry. Finally, 
on 31 July he agreed to sign the bill and forward it for signature to President Yanukovych. 
According to a report by Radio Free Europe, Lytvyn explained his decision as follows: 
“If none of the suggestions of the Speaker are accepted, then he is obliged to sign the 
submitted law immediately.”62 Viktor Yanukovych signed the legislation on 8 August. 
Thus, “Act 5029-VI on the Foundations of State Language Policy” entered into force on 
10 August.63 The real purpose and effect of the language law will be determined in the 
coming months. At this stage, it is too earlier for a clear impression – especially in view 
of the autumn 2012 parliamentary elections and likelihood that the legislation will be 
used in campaign strategies.
Ukraine’s elections serve as a prism through which to explore Hungarian–
Ukrainian relations. Presidential elections are held every seven years in Ukraine, 
while parliamentary and local government elections are held every four years. The 
parliamentary elections of 2007 were brought forward, and so the parliamentary and 
local government elections no longer coincide. Consequently, the Parliament elected 
on 28 October 2012 must function alongside a president elected in 2010 and local 
governments also elected in 2010.
The current election law was passed on 17 November 2011. Under what is a mixed 
election system, 225 MPs are elected in constituencies (voting districts) and 255 from 
the party lists. The necessary threshold is five percent of total votes. Candidates in the 
constituencies are put forward by the political parties or may run as independents. 
Candidate registration is subject to the payment of a relatively large fee: 12 times the 
minimum wage in the case of a constituency candidate (i.e., approx. USD 1,500) or 
– for the party lists – 2,000 times the minimum wage (i.e., approx. USD 250,000). The 
voters’ register is drawn up on the basis of the personal data and address register. 
Resolution 1862 (2012) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 
the functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine (26 January 2012) negatively 
appraised several aspects of Ukrainian democracy, but the country’s election law 
received a positive assessment: the resolution noted that the election law had been 
adopted on the basis of a broad consensus between the government and opposition 
parties.64 Overall, 87 parties took part in the elections: 22 parties put forward lists 
of candidates and 81 parties fielded candidates in the constituencies. Voter turnout 
was 57.99 percent, with votes being cast by 21 million of a total 37 million people 
entitled to vote. The end result was made known after a fierce political battle: five 
parties won seats in Parliament on the lists, while most of the successful constituency 
candidates were also from these parties. The five parties were: the Party of Regions; 
the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (“Batkivshchyna”); UDAR – Ukrainian Democratic Alliance 
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for Reform of Vitali Klitschko (the boxer’s party was not only a newcomer in national 
politics but also achieved substantial success in the 2010 local government elections); 
the Communist Party (the only party to have held seats in Parliament throughout 
the period since independence); and the radical-nationalist All-Ukrainian Union 
(“Svoboda”).65 The latter’s performance was the real upset of the election: analysts had 
predicted it would barely acquire the necessary 5 percent of the vote, but in the end it 
won more than 10 percent of the vote. This is the first time such a party has won seats 
in the Ukrainian Parliament. For this reason it is difficult to predict the party’s likely 
course (the experiences of other European countries in this regard are varied).
Prior to the elections the most serious controversy surrounded the drawing up of 
constituency boundaries. The Hungarian government also made efforts to ensure 
the presence of a “Hungarian constituency” among the various constituencies in the 
Transcarpathian region, where the election of an ethnic Hungarian candidate would be 
a possibility. Between 1994 until 2006, the ethnic Hungarian population in the region 
had its own MP in Parliament. However, in the two more recent elections (2006, 2007), 
the community failed to elect an MP. In the end, a “Hungarian constituency” – which 
might have resulted in an overt struggle between the two ethnic Hungarian parties 
(the Hungarian Democratic Party in Ukraine and the Hungarian Party in Ukraine) – was 
not established. Instead, a backroom deal was attempted once more. Miklós Kovács, 
chairman of the Hungarian Party in Ukraine, stated at a public forum that
the Ukrainian leadership made an offer to the government of Hungary according 
to which it would arrange for a representative of the ethnic Hungarian community 
to be voted into the national Parliament by means of the election list of the Party 
of Regions. […] the Hungarian government, however, stuck to its principled 
position, arguing that what is at stake in the elections is the representation of the 
interests of the Hungarians of the Transcarpathian region, rather than a presence 
in Parliament […] For this reason Hungary did not accept the Ukrainian offer, 
because its previous request to Kiev had been for a Hungarian constituency rather 
than a Hungarian parliamentary representative. And this request had not been 
met by the Ukrainian side […].66
This decision, however, created a new and more favourable situation for the 
Hungarian Democratic Party of Ukraine: the government party offered a place on 
its list to its representative, as a means of solving the issue of ethnic Hungarian 
representation in the Ukrainian Parliament. At the time of the 2010 presidential 
elections, the Hungarian Democratic Party of Ukraine decided, in view of its 
experiences during the Vakarchuk era, to form a strategic alliance with the Party 
of Regions, which had ties to the candidate who was later elected as head of 
state. Its MP was included in the committee drafting the language law, and yet, 
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at that time, the possibility of a place on the Parliamentary list had not even been 
discussed. Incidentally, an examination of the results of the 2010 local elections in 
the Transcarpathian region reveals that at the county, municipal and district level 
60.2 percent of the ethnic Hungarian representatives had been candidates of the 
Hungarian Democratic Party in Ukraine, while 39.8 percent had been candidates of 
the Hungarian Party of Ukraine. However, at the rural level, where 64.6 percent of 
the ethnic Hungarians live, these parties are barely represented. Indeed, most of the 
ethnic Hungarian representatives are independents.67
In late November 2012, it would seem that the candidate of the Hungarian 
Democratic Party in Ukraine will be one of the list MPs if the Party of Regions manages 
to form a government and those candidates further up the list who become ministers 
are removed from the list (as the two positions are incompatible). Otherwise there is 
no chance of a seat for the Hungarian Democratic Party. Meanwhile the Hungarian 
Party in Ukraine fielded candidates in three constituencies. The nature of the election 
system and the small percentage of ethnic Hungarians meant they had no chance of 
success and, ultimately, they obtained even fewer votes than they had expected.68 This 
poor result was not only due to the fact that the Hungarian Democratic Party was 
campaigning alongside the Party of Regions; it also reflected protest votes at the local 
level of Hungarian society.
In Hungarian–Ukrainian relations, there remain at least two other open questions. 
The first concerns the matter of dual citizenship, which is not legally recognised by 
Ukraine. Article 4 of the Constitution states the following: “There shall be a single form 
of citizenship in Ukraine.” According to Article 25, “No citizen of Ukraine shall be 
deprived of citizenship or of the right to change citizenship. No citizen of Ukraine 
shall be exiled from Ukraine or surrendered to another state.” The provisions of the 
current Citizenship Act, adopted in 2001, reiterate this idea; it too recognises a single 
form of citizenship. To date the Ukrainian government has shown no intent to officially 
address the issue of dual citizenship. On the other hand, the possibility of sanctions 
has been raised on several occasions in the legislature. For Ukraine the issue of dual 
citizenship pertains not only to its relations with Hungary. Even so, this does not mean 
that Hungary should be satisfied with the current “implicit” arrangement.69
The other open question is the status of the Hungarian–Ukrainian joint committee 
on minorities. The 15th session of the Hungarian–Ukrainian Intergovernmental Joint 
Committee on the Rights of the National Minorities, held in Budapest on 19 December 
2001, ended without a protocol. This had never happened before in the history of the 
Joint Committee, which was established on the basis of a declaration on the rights of 
the national minorities, signed on 31 May 1991 by the ministers of foreign affairs of 
Hungary and Ukraine. Although such protocols are generally symbolic in nature, 
nevertheless the Joint Committee is an important forum for the discussion of matters 
concerning the minorities.
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Ukrainian analysts acknowledge that Hungarians in Ukraine have greater 
“visibility” than their population ratio might warrant (ethnic Hungarians make up 
only 0.3 percent of the country’s population). Regrettably, the issue of the Magyar 
monument at Verecke (Veretsky) Pass has accentuated this trend. The area in question 
at Verecke Pass is commonly regarded as no-man’s-land, for it was only until 1980 
that the main road passed through here. Hungary’s press gave the impression to its 
readers that extremist Ukrainian nationalists were preventing or dishonouring the 
commemoration of this important landmark in Hungarian history. In fact, however, 
the story does not begin with the protests against the Verecke monument. Rather, it is 
a consequence of the excavation works that have been underway for some years at the 
Verecke Pass as part of efforts by the Ukrainian authorities to disinter the Sich soldiers 
allegedly massacred there by units of the Royal Hungarian Army in March 1939. The 
Sich soldiers earned themselves a place in Ukrainian national history as the defenders 
of Carpatho-Ukraine after its declaration of independence in 1939. According to some 
interpretations, therefore, the erection of a Hungarian monument at this site serves to 
dishonour the memory of these Ukrainian national heroes rather than to commemorate 
Hungarian history. The issue is topical: as noted above, in October 2012, a far-right 
nationalist party entered Parliament for the first time in the history of independent 
Ukraine, and this party has been linked on several occasions with the destruction of 
the Hungarian monument at Verecke. Moreover the far-right party was victorious in 
Lviv County, and Verecke forms a section of the border between the Transcarpathian 
region and Lviv County. So far it is Hungary that has made gestures in this matter: in 
2009, the Varjúlapos Memorial was inaugurated at Nyírtelek, which commemorates, 
among others, the Sich soldiers who were brought there after mid-March 1939.70 And 
in 2012, following a Hungarian proposal, an international scholarly discourse began on 
the events of March 1939, supported by the European Network for Remembrance and 
Solidarity among other bodies.71
At the time of the Hungarian EU Presidency, Minister of Foreign Affairs János 
Martonyi stated the following: “We take into account that for Ukraine in its present 
state the relationship with Russia is particularly important. Without even raising the 
question or necessity of a choice, we seek to strengthen Ukraine’s bonds with Europe’s 
centre of attraction, the European Union.”72 The right course of action is to conclude the 
EU–Ukraine Association Agreement – which is clearly in Hungary’s interest. We know 
that this step would bring many issues with uncertain outcomes into the European 
stream.
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